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ABSTRACT 
The American military needs to understand what incentivizes some African nations to 
participate in peacekeeping in order to strengthen the incentive structure so that high 
levels of peacekeeping will continue.  The main argument advanced in this thesis is that 
regimes that are attempting to increase their structural legitimacy are more likely to 
volunteer for peacekeeping missions to gain international political legitimacy, as well as 
domestic social and economic legitimacy.  This hypothesis is based on a synthesis of 
constructivism and political economy.  The constructivist perspective argues that regimes 
that govern societies with identities and norms based on protecting others can gain 
domestic legitimacy through benevolent external actions; this same argument holds true 
for increasing international legitimacy by following international norms.  This hypothesis 
is also based on a political economy argument that the monetary benefits from 
peacekeeping are transmitted throughout the military and society, resulting in domestic 
legitimacy.  Quantitative results show that a state’s structural legitimacy is correlated to 
its level of peacekeeping in a U-shaped curve, meaning that states attempting to increase 
their legitimacy participate at a higher-than-expected level.  Likewise, the case study of 
Rwanda’s involvement in the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur illustrates 
that the Rwandan Patriotic Front government reaps economic, social and political 
benefits from peacekeeping that strengthen that regime’s legitimacy. 
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Just 14 years after the genocide of at least a half million Rwandans, Rwanda 
deployed 3,800 peacekeepers to the joint United Nations African Union Mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID), the second largest contribution of peacekeepers to that mission.1  A 
high level of participation in peacekeeping missions is not limited to Rwanda; the 
percentage of United Nations peacekeepers coming from African countries has increased 
from 8% in 1991 to 28% in 2011.  Of the 100,000 UN peacekeepers and 8,000 African 
Union peacekeepers supplied by 115 nations around the world in January of 2011, 
African states contributed 38,000 of those soldiers.  However, only 17 of the 48 Sub- 
Saharan African states contributed peacekeeping troops and the size of those 
contributions varied widely.  Thus, what are the determinants that convince Sub-Saharan 
African states to participate at a certain level in peacekeeping missions? 
Since the end of the Cold War, and specifically after the American involvement in 
Somalia in the early 1990s, the West has shied away from military involvement on the 
African continent.  This resulted in the phrase “African Solutions to African Problems,” 
mainly in reference to security issues.  Paul Williams asserts that now “African 
governments bear the primary responsibility for these conflicts… [and] they should take 
the lead in responding to them.”2  This trend is likely to continue as international actors 
refuse to militarily intervene in situations that are not vital national interests.3  This trend 
led many authors to conclude that African militaries will be in charge of conducting even 
UN peacekeeping operations on the continent.4 
                                                 
1 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Contributors to United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations,” last modified August 2011, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.   
2 Paul Williams, “Keeping the Peace in Africa: Why ‘African’ Solutions are not Enough,” Ethics and 
International Affairs 22 (2008): 310; Jakkie Cilliers, “Peacekeeping, Africa and the Emerging Global 
Security Architecture,” African Security Review, 12 (2003): 1. 
3Stephan Klingebiel, “Africa’s New Peace and Security Architecture: Converging the Roles of 
External Actors and African Interests,” African Security Review 14 (2005): 40. 
4 Gerry Cleaver and Roy May, “Peacekeeping: the African Dimension,” Review of African Political 
Economy 22 (1995): 485; Danielle Beswick, “Peacekeeping, Regime Security and ‘African Solutions to 
African Problems’: Exploring Motivations for Rwanda’s Involvement in Darfur.”  Third World Quarterly 
31 (2010): 740.  
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UN peacekeeping missions are important but notoriously poorly executed.  
According to Virginia Paige Fortna, peacekeeping missions are important because, 
“peace lasts substantially longer when international personnel deploy than when states 
are left to maintain peace on their own.”5 However, UN missions are under-resourced 
and the personnel they do have are usually poorly trained, insufficiently equipped, and 
inadequately led, resulting in an inability to fulfill their mandates.  In contrast, the 
Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) soldiers in UNAMID are motivated, well equipped and 
competently led.6  Therefore, it is important for the United States to understand why 
nations like Rwanda are willing to participate in peacekeeping so that the United States 
can influence other competent armies to take on a larger role in peacekeeping missions.  
The United States cannot influence other states without the foundational knowledge of 
why certain African states participate in peacekeeping missions, and unfortunately 
current international relations and political economy theories fall short in explaining 
exactly that. 
Neorealism’s underlying principles of international anarchy and selfish states 
attempting to increase their comparative levels of power is flawed on a continent that has 
spent the last twenty years building and strengthening regional and continental 
organizations like ECOWAS and the African Union.  Benedikt Franke describes the 
phenomenon of cooperation in Africa, where “regional awareness and a collective 
identity based on shared historical experiences and cultural ties provide the basis and 
motivation for cooperation.”7  However, those same institutions are very frail, as 
demonstrated by the poor performance of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
prior to the UN’s involvement.  This weakness of institutions undermines institutional 
liberalism’s foundational theory that institutions can foster effective cooperation between 
states.   
                                                 
5 Virginia Paige Fortna, “Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects,” World 
Politics 56 (2004): 517. 
6 Beswick, “Peacekeeping, Regime Security,” 745. 
7 Benedikt Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2009), 21. 
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As to the economics of peacekeeping, the United Nations pays peacekeepers 
through state governments, thus creating a revenue stream of foreign reserves for every 
peacekeeping government, but states in similar economic situations have opposing ideas 
on peacekeeping; therefore, the money alone cannot explain why states participate in 
peacekeeping.  In short, the current theories of why states participate in peacekeeping 
missions do not pertain to Sub-Saharan Africa and a more thorough international 
relations and political economy explanation is needed. 
The main argument advanced in this thesis will be that regimes that are 
attempting to increase their structural legitimacy are more likely to volunteer for 
peacekeeping missions to gain international political legitimacy as well as domestic 
social and economic legitimacy.  This hypothesis is based on a synthesis of 
constructivism and political economy.  The constructivist perspective argues that regimes 
that govern societies with identities and norms based on protecting others can gain 
domestic legitimacy through benevolent external actions; this same argument holds for 
increasing international legitimacy by following international norms.  This hypothesis is 
also based on a political economy argument that the monetary benefits from 
peacekeeping are transmitted throughout the military and society, resulting in domestic 
legitimacy.  The author’s preliminary conclusion for the case study portion of this thesis 
is that the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) government participates in peacekeeping 
because political legitimacy can be attained through the socio-political and economic 
benefits of peacekeeping. 
A. DEFINITIONS 
It is necessary to define two of the most important and contentious terms that will 
be used throughout this thesis.  These terms are peacekeeping and regime legitimacy.  
United Nations peacekeeping is tricky to define, as best demonstrated by former UN 
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, who described peacekeeping as being authorized 
under “chapter six and a half,” of the UN Charter.8  Likewise, authors cannot even agree 
                                                 
8 Virginia Paige Fortna and Lise Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature,” 
Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 285. 
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on who should decide which regimes are and are not legitimate, never mind what 
constitutes that legitimacy.  Therefore, both terms will be defined in their broadest 
manner, and then defined as they will be used in this thesis. 
Peacekeeping and its definition has advanced through numerous iterations since 
the end of the Second World War.  International security interventions can be envisioned 
on a three point scale measuring the degree of violence.  Peacekeeping is the lowest on 
this scale, peacemaking the highest and peace enforcement in the middle.  Trevor Findlay 
defines peacekeeping as involving three characteristics; the consent of all parties, the 
impartiality of the peacekeepers and the use of force as a last resort and only in self 
defense.9  Peace enforcement missions share the traits of consent and impartiality, but 
expand this final feature by allowing the peacekeeping force to coerce the parties to 
adhere to previous agreements.  Findlay describes peace enforcement as peacekeepers 
trying “to act impartially in dealing with all the parties, in the manner of an umpire, but in 
doing so may be forced to penalize one or more of them, including through the use of 
force.”10  This use of force is even further expanded in peacemaking in which 
peacekeepers enter a warzone prior to the cessation of hostilities and use more extreme 
levels of force to end the conflict by bringing the warring parties to the negotiating table.  
The United Nations has attempted to conduct all three types of missions to varying levels 
of success. 
For the first 45 years of its existence, UN interventions were limited to traditional 
peacekeeping, as understood under Chapter IV of the UN Charter.  This traditional 
peacekeeping involved only protecting international security post conflict.  In the mid-
1990s, this changed when the UN’s peacekeeping guide, The Blue Helmets, edited their 
definition of peacekeeping to include protecting internal, as well as external, security post 
conflict.11  Throughout the post-Cold War era, peace enforcement also crept into UN 
                                                 
9 Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
4. 
10 Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, 5. 
11 United Nations, The Blue Helmets (London: Brassey’s, 1996), 4. 
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interventions as the UN became more involved in more complex security issues.12  
Finally, the UN usually does not conduct peacemaking interventions, but is allowed to 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  Although the UN shies away from these highly 
dangerous missions, the UN does authorize regional organizations to conduct 
peacemaking operations.  Therefore, since the UN and regional organizations conduct all 
three types of interventions, the term peacekeeping in this thesis will be a blanket term 
for all internal and international security missions endorsed by the UN either during or 
post conflict.   
Regime legitimacy is the most contentious term used throughout this thesis.  
Regime is commonly defined as the set of procedures that determine how power is 
distributed.  Regime legitimacy, as argued by Robert Lamb, involves three parts.13  The 
first part of legitimacy is the form of the state, or how the state is designed to interact 
with its different parts.  The second part is the processes of the state, or how specific 
individuals came to lead the state.  The third part is the policies of the regime, or how 
laws are implemented and enforced.  Unfortunately, there is no agreement on how to 
measure legitimacy using these three parts because legitimacy is determined by the 
populace of each nation.  Western populaces view their states as legitimate because of 
checks and balances between the branches of government, free and fair elections and 
liberal policies; other populaces also view their states as legitimate even if those states are 
controlled by a strong unelected Executive.  These two different forms of legitimacy are 
named structural and contingent, respectively. 
The difference between contingent and structural legitimacy is at the crux of this 
thesis.  Contingent legitimacy is support that will remain as long as the government 
remains authoritarian enough.  An unelected (or unfairly elected) government can sustain 
contingent legitimacy from the majority of its population if it can punish dissenters while 
offering patronage to clients.14  In short, this is coerced support.  This regime will lose its 
                                                 
12 Fortna and Howard, “Pitfalls and Prospects,” 285. 
13 Lamb, Robert.  “Measuring Legitimacy in Weak States.”  University of Maryland: Center for 
International and Security Studies, 18 March 2005, 8.   
14 Lamb, “Measuring Legitimacy,” 20. 
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contingent legitimacy when its revenue decreases and will no longer be able to afford to 
give patronage to keep clients or quiet dissenters.  In contrast, structural legitimacy is the 
populace’s “belief that a regime is worthy of support, that the regime is morally right to 
rule in the particular way it rules,” because the populace has a say in the manner in which 
the regime governs.15  The idea that legitimacy derives from the consent of the governed 
is originally from Locke and Rousseau’s theory of a social contract.  The social contract 
is the theory that a state is legitimate only as long as the state governs according to the 
interests of the people.16  
The difference between contingent and structural legitimacy is demonstrated 
through the three parts of the definition of legitimacy.  A contingently legitimate state can 
remain contingently legitimate even when the executive undermines all other state 
institutions and even through an unfair and unfree election.  However, a structurally 
legitimate state would lose its structural legitimacy if it undermined those institutions or 
from poorly administered elections.   
An unpopular policy decision will not undermine either form of legitimacy, but 
for different reasons.  An unpopular policy decision in a contingently legitimate state will 
not influence the contingent legitimacy of the state because that form of legitimacy does 
not rest on the consent of the governed.  In contrast, the structural legitimate state is 
legitimate because of its institutions and therefore as long as the institutions survive, 
individual policy decisions can be unpopular.  Vanessa Baird argues that structural 
legitimacy (or what she calls diffuse support) “is the belief that although at times specific 
policies can be disagreeable, the institution itself ought to be maintained–it ought to be 
trusted and granted its full set of powers.”17   
A contingently legitimate state can become a structurally legitimate state.  The 
end of the Cold War led to the end of patronage from the United States and U.S.S.R. to 
                                                 
15 Lamb, “Measuring Legitimacy,” 24. 
16 Ernest Barker, ed, Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1960); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Parts One and Two (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 
1958). 
17 Vanessa Baird, “Building Institutional Legitimacy: The Role of Procedural Justice,” Political 
Research Quarterly 54 (2001): 334. 
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African governments merely for their support.  Instead, the United States tied aid to 
democratization, resulting in elections across the continent.  Thus, the post-Cold War 
shift has been to increase the number of structurally legitimate states.  However, political 
parties that rule contingently legitimate states can increase the state’s structural 
legitimacy while also not undermining the party’s monopoly on politics by creating 
policies that are popular and also strengthening the party’s enforcement and patrimonial 
institutions. 
Thus, the definition of legitimacy used throughout this thesis will be based on 
structural legitimacy, and regime legitimacy will be measured on a continuous scale of 
the extent to which each regime has its populace’s consent to govern. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The independent variable in this thesis is regime legitimacy.  Since level of 
legitimacy is a continuous variable based on the populace’s views of the ruling regime, 
legitimacy will be measured as an interval variable.  However, at times, states will be 
clustered into four groups based on similar legitimacy ratings.  This nominal scale is, 
from least to most legitimate: low, slight, moderate and high.  Metrics based on level of 
repression and how a state gains authority will be used.  These are reasonable because 
legitimate regimes do not need to be repressive (as measured by Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World metric) and must gain their legitimacy through the consent of the 
governed (as measured by Polity IV’s Authority Trends metric) to be structurally 
legitimate. 
The dependent variable is level of peacekeeping participation.  This will be 
measured in two manners.  First, peacekeeping will be measured as an ordinal variable to 
determine the number of peacekeeping missions each state participates in.  However, 
since participation in a UN mission can range from an individual peacekeeper to multiple 
battalions of soldiers, this metric does not accurately measure the level of participation.  
Thus, peacekeeping will also be measured as a ratio variable with the number of 
peacekeepers contributed to all UN missions divided by the number of soldiers in the  
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army of the contributing state.  This not only measures how many soldiers the state 
deploys, but more importantly, the level of peacekeeping in comparison to the state’s 
ability to send peacekeepers.  
The casual mechanism between the two variables is based on the constructivist 
and political economy theories of peacekeeping.  In short, regimes will use peacekeeping 
in their effort to transition from contingent to structural legitimacy.  Through high levels 
of peacekeeping, contingently legitimate regimes can increase their domestic moral 
authority in the political and social realms while also economically developing the 
country.  Meanwhile, these regimes also increase their moral authority externally by 
adhering to, or even leading, international norms based on human security.   
The methodology will be both quantitative and qualitative.  In Chapter II, the 
thesis will outline the international relations arguments for peacekeeping by reviewing 
the literature while also presenting an overarching regime legitimacy argument.  In 
Chapter III, the thesis will test three hypotheses that repression and regime legitimacy are 
correlated to participation in peacekeeping.  A linear regression will test the first 
hypothesis, and then parabolic regressions will test the remaining two hypotheses.  
Finally, in Chapter IV, the thesis will test the correlation between the two variables using 
Rwanda’s participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur as a case study.  
Rwanda is the critical case because of its dramatic evolution in just 15 years by 






II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING 
Neorealism and institutional liberalism fail to account for the emergence of 
medium-powers as major peacekeepers in Sub-Saharan Africa.  While neorealism 
discounts the peacekeeping interests of nonliberal democracies, institutional liberalism 
focuses on Western peacekeepers.18  Even the constructivists have generally ignored 
Africa.  However, constructivism and the spread of international norms best explain this 
new phenomenon in African security.  Alexander Wendt asserts that a “systemic process 
that may encourage collective identity formation is the transnational convergence of 
domestic values.”19  Those transnational values include promoting human rights and 
economic growth.  Constructivists explain why states would want to participate in 
peacekeeping to become accepted members of the international community, and political 
economists explain the material benefits of peacekeeping; together, the constructivists 
and political economists agree that peacekeeping increases regime legitimacy. 
Constructivists question why poor states participate in peacekeeping since 
peacekeeping is a public good.  A public good is a non-excludable result from which 
uninvolved parties can profit by freeloading off of involved parties.  Peacekeeping fits 
this definition since a few nations take the burden of peacekeeping but all nations benefit 
from peace in the world.  Thus, since peacekeeping is a public good, there is incentive for 
poor states to shift the burden of peacekeeping to richer states while enjoying the benefits 
of stable neighbors.20  However, this entire thesis is focused on poor states participating 
in peacekeeping operations.   
The constructivists explain this phenomenon by asserting that peacekeeping is not 
merely a public good because the participating countries can also benefit privately by 
                                                 
18 Allehone Mulugeta, “Promises and Challenges of a Sub-Regional Force for the Horn of Africa,” 
International Peacekeeping 15 (April 2008). 
19 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political 
Science Review 88 (1994): 390. 
20 Jyoti Khanna, Todd Sandler and Hirofumi Shimizu, “Sharing the financial burden for UN and 
NATO Peacekeeping, 1976–1996,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42 (1998): 181. 
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gaining political authority in international organizations.21  Todd Sandler’s joint product 
model of public goods asserts that states will increase their contributions to public goods 
when the private benefits increase.22  Likewise, this pursuit of self-interest does not 
contrast with positive collective results; peacekeeping for selfish reasons still provides a 
necessary public good.  The private benefits associated with peacekeeping include 
increased moral authority both internally and internationally for the regime; meanwhile, 
the economic benefits including higher military salaries, less state money used to fund the 
military and more remittances, foreign aid and foreign direct investment (FDI).   
These benefits illustrate the ultimate conclusion of increasing regime legitimacy.  
In the mid-1990s, Laura Neack declared that the nations that benefit from the status quo 
of the international system will participate the most often in peacekeeping.23  However, 
since the 1990s, more African states that are not status quo powers have begun 
volunteering for peacekeeping.  This is because peacekeeping is no longer the manner in 
which powerful states keep the international status quo, but instead, the manner in which 
unstable regimes keep the domestic status quo.  This literature review will outline the 
agreements, disagreements and gaps in these schools of thought while focusing on the 
relationship between society, economics and regime legitimacy in African states.   
B. CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Constructivism is not so much a parsimonious theory of international relations as 
an approach to studying international relations.  Unlike realism, constructivism asserts 
that domestic politics matter and that those politics are influenced by ideas, norms and 
social identity, but like realism, states remain the unit of analysis in constructivism.  
Alexander Wendt, the father of modern constructivism, explains the foundational 
principle of any constructivist research, “Idealism [is] the view that the culture of 
                                                 
21 Hirofumi Shimizu and Todd Sandler, “Peacekeeping and Burden-Sharing, 1994–2000,” Public 
Finance Review 31(2003): 129. 
22 Bruce Russett, What Price Vigilance?  (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970); Todd 
Sandler, “The Impurity of Defense: An Application to the Economics of Alliances,” Kyklos 30 (1977); 
quoted in Davis Bobrow and Mark Boyer, “Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping 
Operations,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (December 1997): 726. 
23 Laura Neack, “UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?” Journal of Peace Research 
32 (1995): 184. 
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international life does depend on what states do—that anarchy is what states make of it— 
and that IR should therefore focus on showing how states create that culture and so might 
transform it.”24  This literature review of constructivism will do exactly that; after 
exploring the underlying assumptions and principles of constructivism, we will look at 
the three manners in which domestic and international identities can change and how 
those changes influence regime behavior. 
Constructivism’s foundational assertion is that social norms shape interests and 
interests determine state behavior.25  This is especially relevant with weak African states 
that are unable to project their power beyond their capitals.  Christopher Clapham 
describes this phenomenon, “The less solid the state, the greater the need to look beyond 
it for an understanding of how the society that it claims to govern fits into the 
international system.”26  How that society understands its role in the international system 
is based on the populace’s norms.  Constructivism argues that society creates the norms 
of each state; norms then define identities and identities are the synthesis of common 
views and values that form a group conscience that thereafter sets behavior.27  Therefore, 
identities determine the material interests of the state, a direct contradiction of 
neorealism’s foundation in materialism.28   
Constructivism believes in the possibility of progress in international relations.  
Constructivists see the steps of progress as matching three prominent political 
philosophers: Hobbes, Locke and Kant; the Hobbesian culture is based on perpetual 
conflict, the Lockean on self-control and the Kantian on friendship.29  The difference 
between Lockean and Kantian cultures is viewpoint: the Hobbesian and even Lockean 
cultures see the world (or at least their region) as “Us” and “Them” while the Kantian 
                                                 
24 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 377. 
25 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 385. 
26 Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5.   
27 Benedikt Franke, Security Cooperation in Africa (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2009), 26. 
28 Franke, Security Cooperation, 27. 
29 Review of Social Theory of International Politics, by Alexander Wendt, Review of International 
Studies 26 (2000): 123.   
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culture sees the world as “We.” Alexander Wendt explains how this transformation is 
possible when societies expand their “sense of Self [to] include the group, and this group 
consciousness in turn creates a rudimentary capacity for other-help, not just in the passive 
sense of self-restrain but in the active sense of being willing to come to…other’s aid.”30  
Constructivists argue that this change, and progress, occurs because of ideas. 
The first manner in which identities change is through the spread of novel 
domestic ideas, or bottom-up norm building.  The quickest way in which new ideas 
become widely accepted is after a traumatic event affects the entire populace.  This 
theory, that trauma can change an entire group’s identity, is based on both psychology 
and political science.  After clinical psychology tests, Vamik Volkan concluded, “The 
group draws the mental representation of a traumatic event into its very identity. It passes 
the mental representation of the event—along with associated shared feelings of hurt and 
shame, and defenses against the perceived shared conflicts they initiate—from generation 
to generation.”31  The transfer of the traumatic event to future generations illustrates that 
this concept has become more than an idea and has extended to become an identity.   
Peter Uvin agrees that spectacular violence creates social restrictions that become 
part of self-identity.32  These traumatic events can decrease differences between social 
groups to the point that those groups positively identify with other groups.33  In 
Mobilizing the Will to Intervene, a book that outlines why international actors did not 
stop the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the authors declare that civil society is responsible for 
persuading governments that the prevention of atrocities is in the national interest of 
every country.34  This bottom-up norm building has already succeeded in some Western 
countries, with Canada as the best example; Canadian public opinion polls prove that 
after the failures in Rwanda, Canadians became even more supportive of their military 
                                                 
30 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 293. 
31 Vamik Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International 
Relationships (Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1994): xxv.  Quote from Peter Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in 
Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence,” Comparative Politics 31 (Apr 1999): 266. 
32 Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power,” 265. 
33 Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 390. 
34Frank Chalk et al., Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership to Prevent Mass Atrocities 
(Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2010), 1. 
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conducting peacekeeping operations, and Canadian civil society has even coerced its 
government into volunteering for peacekeeping missions that the Canadian military did 
not want to join.35  Thus, traumatic events can create new domestic ideas that forge new 
state interests.  However, not all civil societies are as effective as in Canada and thus 
states will not necessarily pursue these new interests at all times.36  Therefore, top-down 
norm building must also be part of this equation. 
In the second manner of norm building, top-down, leaders use history, politics 
and nationalism to create a collective identity.37  Constructivists argue that while leaders 
cannot control identity formation, leaders can move identity formation in specific 
directions.38  Wendt states this succinctly, “States need to do certain things to secure their 
identities, and it is in their nature to try to discover what these things are and act 
accordingly.  They may have room for interpretive license, but that does not mean they 
are free to construct their interests any way they like.”39  Thus, regimes in post-trauma 
societies have a unique opportunity to capitalize on the society’s newfound bottom-up 
norm building and the regime can increase internal legitimacy by co-opting the identity-
formation process.40  These regimes can attempt to increase the definition of “us” for 
social groups by focusing on similarities with other groups.  Post-traumatic regimes 
recognize peacekeeping as a means in which to increase “us” and thereby the regime’s 
moral authority, both domestically and internationally. 
Norms can also be disbursed through international interaction.  These norms are 
not top-down from strong countries or organizations, but instead international consensus 
on basic ideas.  This weaker form of constructivism asserts that interactions with other 
                                                 
35 Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, “Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping in a turbulent 
world,” International Journal 50 (Spring 1995): 376. 
36 Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Conflict After the Cold 
War, edited by Richard Betts, 3rd ed. (New York: Pearson, 2008), 237. 
37 Frances Stewart, “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities,” Oxford Development Studies 
28 (2000): 247.  
38  Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.”  
International Organization 46 (Spring 1992). 
39 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 238. 
40 Bruce Cronin, Community under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 36. 
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states changes identities as the states recognize similar values.41  This creates 
international norms that structure interests in a coordinated manner across all states.42  
International norms have changed since the end of the Cold War, specifically in the area 
of human rights.  Governments now have a responsibility to protect not only their own 
citizens but also citizens who are threatened by genocide or ethnic cleansing in other 
countries.  Promoting human rights is now a major interest to many states, including 
Western governments with large aid flows.  Thus, regimes can supply peacekeepers to 
satisfy other states into supporting what is perceived as a Kantian (selfless) act.  Jonah 
Victor argues that “African leaders—and specifically autocrats—have turned to 
peacekeeping opportunities as a way to win the favor of major powers in the post-Cold 
War era.”43  This allows regimes to increase their leverage in international organizations, 
like the United Nations, by showing how the regimes follow the liberal norms of the 
international community.  Borrowing Joseph Nye’s phrase, regimes can increase their 
soft power by becoming leaders in peacekeeping.44  Thus, international norms incentivize 
regimes to use peacekeeping to gain external legitimacy. 
Constructivism’s basic precept is that in foreign policy matters, regimes are 
constrained, but also empowered, by domestic and international societies.45  Domestic 
and international norms force regimes to act in a certain manner, but regimes, especially 
regimes in post-trauma societies, can take advantage of norms or even steer norms in a 
certain direction to the regime’s benefit.  Since constructivism acknowledges that 
predicating changes in identities is difficult, it is nearly impossible to anticipate the future 
identity of any society.  What is predictable is that regimes learn.  Rousseau, perhaps the 
first constructivist, asserted that actions are learnt through interaction with society.  Thus, 
                                                 
41 David Williams, Review of Africa and the International System, by Christopher Clapham, Africa: 
Journal of the International African Institute 68 (1998): 436.   
42 Finnemore, “Constructing Norms,” 237. 
43 Jonah Victor, “African peacekeeping in Africa: Warlord Politics, Defense Economics, and State 
Legitimacy,” Journal of Peace Research 47 (2010): 220.  
44 Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
1990), 188. 
45 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International 
Security 23 (Summer 1998): 179. 
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perhaps societies that consistently participate in peacekeeping for selfish reasons will 
eventually internalize peacemaking as their new identity.46  Or perhaps the selfish 
reasons will be enough to convince these regimes to continue peacekeeping. 
C. POLITICAL ECONOMY 
States also participate in peacekeeping because the economic benefits of 
peacekeeping positively influence the populace’s image of the regime.  According to 
Jonathan Kirshner, “All states in coming years will find their security positions 
increasingly influenced by political economy.”47  Therefore, regimes look for political 
avenues through which they can strengthen their economies.  Peacekeeping is one of 
those political avenues.  Through peacekeeping, the regime can pay its soldiers more, 
increase remittances to its citizens and increase its foreign reserves to pay for trade 
deficits.  Furthermore, through the positive public image created via peacekeeping, the 
regime can increase the foreign aid promised to the state and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) for the private sector.  Thus, peacekeeping has the ability to garner economic 
growth, and in the words of Friedrich List, “The power of creating wealth is vastly more 
important than wealth itself.”48 
Peacekeeping is a legal way to use the military to fund itself.  In states in which 
the government has difficulty collecting taxes, and thereby funding itself internally, states 
look for ways to save money.  Throughout the world, intrastate wars have a criminalized 
component in which minerals and other resources are smuggled in order to sustain the 
war.49  In the Great Lakes Region of Africa specifically, this has often been through 
intervening in the intrastate wars of neighboring countries to claim resources. Danielle 
Beswick claims that “This interventionism illustrates a number of trends in African 
politics and interstate relations… [including] the propensity of interveners to profit 
                                                 
46 Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” 390. 
47 Jonathan Kirshner, “Political Economy in Security Studies after the Cold War,” Review of 
International Political Economy 5 (Spring 1998): 75. 
48 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1856); 
quoted in Kirshner, 66. 
49 Peter Andreas, “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia,” International 
Studies Quarterly 48 (Mar 2004): 29. 
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economically through their actions.”50  Thus, African states have a history of using 
military interventions to fund their militaries.  Along the same lines, peacekeeping is a 
legal way in which the state profits, the military becomes self-sufficient and the 
international community not only does not impose sanctions, but rewards the 
peacekeeper.   
The first reward for peacekeeping is a United Nations stipend of $1080 per 
peacekeeper per month.  This stipend is paid directly to the central government of the 
peacekeeping state and then is supposed to be redistributed to individual peacekeepers.51  
The regime has three options for how to spend this money: give all, none, or some of it to 
the peacekeepers. The first option is to give the peacekeepers the entire UN stipend.  
Since the stipends are usually considerably higher than the soldier’s normal monthly 
salary, this option increases the structural legitimacy of the regime to the soldier.  Since 
the peacekeepers are in post-conflict zones with poor economies, most of the stipend 
becomes remitted.  The remittance further structurally legitimizes the regime to the 
recipient of the remittances since the recipient should understand where that extra money 
came from.   
The second option for the central government is to the give none of the UN 
stipend to the peacekeepers.  This allows the military to fund itself to a greater extent by 
using the UN money to pay salaries and equipment expenses.  However, this option also 
carries a risk.  Max Sesay argues that the military coup in Sierra Leone in 1992, led by 
Valentine Strasser and other soldiers who had participated in the Liberia peacekeeping 
mission, was partially a result of the soldiers never being paid the ECOWAS 
peacekeeping stipend.52  Likewise, John Wiseman argues that the military coup two years 
later in the Gambia, led by Yahya Jammeh and other soldiers who had also participated in 
                                                 
50 Beswick, “Peacekeeping, Regime Security,” 749. 
51 Victor, “African Peacekeeping,” 221. 
52 Max Sesay, “Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia,” Review of African Political Economy 
67 (1996): 39. 
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the Liberia peacekeeping mission, had the same underlying cause.53  Thus, since the mid-
1990s, governments normally do not pick this riskier option.   
The third option is for the central government to give some of the UN stipend and 
keep the remainder.  A portion of the UN stipend ($68) is earmarked by the UN to cover 
expenses for gear and equipment and another portion ($5) for weaponry; since all of that 
is government equipment, the government would have reason to keep that portion.  Using 
this precedent, the government could keep some of the rest of the stipend to pay for other 
military expenses (including salaries of soldiers who are not peacekeeping).  Meanwhile, 
the government still receives some increased structural legitimacy from the peacekeepers 
who are earning at least some extra pay and from the recipients of remittances.  In this 
scenario, governments walk a fine line as their soldiers know how much of the 
peacekeeper’s stipend the government is keeping, possibility resulting in a repeat of the 
Sierra Leone/Gambia debacle.  Therefore, governments must weigh the benefits of 
increasing their revenue with the costs associated with disillusioning their soldiers.  
Regardless of which option the government picks, the state will increase its 
foreign reserve holdings.  Every state that has a trade deficit needs foreign reserves and 
states do not want to have to ration their foreign reserves.  Thus, regimes can increase 
their structural legitimacy by having excess foreign reserves.  The UN sends the 
peacekeeping stipend in American Dollars to the state, and the state pays its peacekeepers 
in the local currency.  Ioan Lewis and James Mayall use the example of AMISOM as an 
illustration of how states use peacekeeping to increase their foreign reserves, “Supplying 
troops was…a profitable business, especially for Third World countries short of hard 
currency.”54  Therefore, just from the UN stipend, the government has increased its 
foreign reserves and either remittances (by paying the peacekeepers all of the stipend) or 
budget (by paying none of the stipend), or both (by paying only some of the stipend).  All 
three have a positive impact on regime legitimacy. 
                                                 
53 John Wiseman, “Military Rule in the Gambia: An Interim Assessment,” Third World Quarterly 17 
(Dec 1996): 920. 
54 Ioan Lewis and James Mayall, “Somalia,” in The New Interventionism, 1991–1994: United Nations 
Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, edited by James Mayall (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 123.  
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The economic explanation for peacekeeping is not shared by all researchers.  
Andrew Blum concludes quantitatively that lower GDP does not correlate with higher 
rates of participation in peacekeeping.55  Likewise, the UN is slow to pay peacekeeping 
governments the allotted stipend.56  Furthermore, if the money is the deciding factor, why 
would Burundi participate in AMIS where their peacekeepers are paid by the African 
Union half ($500) of what Rwanda’s peacekeepers in UNAMID ($1080) are paid?  
Therefore, more than the direct UN stipend must be part of the decision making process 
and a larger political economy explanation is necessary. 
By adhering, supporting and even leading international norms, states reap 
economic benefits through foreign aid and FDI.  Economic stability and growth is a 
regime security concern since economic stagnation can undermine any regime.57  For 
most African states, foreign aid is necessary to close budget deficits, which increases 
economic stability.  Foreign aid can also assist short-term economic growth through the 
state.  Foreign aid is dependent upon the donor’s goodwill, and that goodwill is based on 
the perception of the recipient state.  The image of the recipient state is up to the regime 
in charge, and a poor image brought about by repressing the populace or intervening in 
other countries can be overcome by a Kantain act like peacekeeping.  A positive image is 
also necessary for FDI, which fuels economic growth over the long term.  Richard 
Rosecrance argues that, 
Direct investment represents a much more permanent stake in the 
economic welfare of the host nation than exports to that market could ever 
be.  Foreign productions is a more permanent economic commitment than 
foreign sales, because large shares of a foreign company or subsidiary 
could not be sold on a stock exchange.58   
 
                                                 
55 Andrew Blum, “Blue Helmets from the South: Accounting for the Participation of Weaker States in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” Journal of Conflict Studies 20 (2000): 7. 
56 Trevor Findlay, “The New Peacekeepers and the New Peacekeeping,” in Challenges for the New 
Peacekeepers, edited by Trevor Findlay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 9. 
57 Kirshner, “Political Economy in Security Studies,” 66. 
58 Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World 
(New York: Basic Books, 1986). 
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Thus economic stability and growth is essential to regime security and foreign aid covers 
budget deficits while FDI increases growth potential.  Both foreign aid and FDI are 
dependent upon the regime’s image, which the regime can strengthen through 
peacekeeping. 
D. CONCLUSION: REGIME LEGITIMACY 
Constructivism and political economy both explain how regimes can increase 
their domestic and internationally legitimacy by participating in peacekeeping operations.  
Sub-Saharan African regimes use peacekeeping to thwart political threats.  Jonah Victor 
succinctly supports this idea that the predominant need in Sub-Saharan Africa is regime 
security; “African foreign policy and military policy has often been used more as a tool to 
promote regime security than as a response to national security threats.”59  Regimes see 
external disturbances as opportunities to secure their rule by bringing together society and 
benefitting economically; Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett assert that “the external 
environment…becomes a source of opportunities for elites lacking domestic legitimacy 
to gain support against internal security threats.”60  Thus, international relations theory 
supports the hypothesis that repressive regimes, those lacking domestic legitimacy, 
participate in peacekeeping.  The remainder of this thesis will discuss the involvement of 
African militaries in peacekeeping generally, and the involvement of the Rwandan 
military specifically. 
                                                 
59 Victor, “African Peacekeeping,” 218. 
60 Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, “Dependent State Formation and Third World 
Militarization,” Review of International Studies 19 (1993): 321.   
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III. QUANTITATIVE TESTS 
The argument that repressive states increase their legitimacy through 
peacekeeping is not shared by all.  Jonah Victor argues that in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
regime legitimacy is positively correlated with the number of peacekeeping operations in 
which a state is willing to participate and that regime legitimacy has no statistical 
correlation to the number of peacekeepers a state sends to those missions.61  Thus, this 
chapter will test three hypotheses on the effect of political repression on number of 
peacekeeping operations, the effect of political repression on the level of participation 
and the effect of regime legitimacy on level of participation. 
Victor’s data begins in 1978 and extends to 2001.  Victor argues that “One 
international interaction in Africa that is not rare and has increased markedly since the 
Cold War is international peacekeeping by African troops.”62  That increase has 
continued at a dramatic rate since the end of Victor’s dataset in 2001.  In that year, a little 
more than 7,500 African soldiers were involved in peacekeeping, but by 2011 that 
number had quadrupled to 30,000 African peacekeepers.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
exponential increase in African peacekeepers since the end of Victor’s data.63 
                                                 
61 Victor, “African Peacekeeping,” 226. 
62 Ibid., 217. 
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Figure 1.   African Troop Contributions to Peacekeeping 
Victor’s sample size (n) from 1981 to 2001 was a mere 39; the sample size from 
2001–2011 was 147. This dramatic increase since the end of Victor’s analysis makes it 
necessary to retest all of Victor’s hypotheses.  Victor used two separate data sets to test 
his two hypotheses.  First, as to the number of peacekeeping operations, Victor quantified 
his independent variable, political repression, by totaling Freedom House’s political 
rights and civil liberties scores to create a Combined Freedom House Score that ranges 
from 2 to 14.  Two represents the most “Free” states, while 14 represents those that 
Freedom House deemed to be the most “Not Free.”  Victor’s dependent variable was the 
number of UN peacekeeping operations in which each state participated, as documented 
by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).  His method 
was linear regression.   
The author replicated his data for 2011 to test this first hypothesis: 








































































































The linear regression is slightly negative with a slope of a mere -0.1843.  This 
nearly horizontal slope (see Figure 2) means that a change in the independent variable 
along the x axis (political repression) has almost no influence on the dependent variable 
along the y axis (number of peacekeeping operations).  Furthermore, the very low 
coefficient of correlation (0.0489) makes the correlation statistically insignificant, as seen 
in Table 1.  
Peacekeeping Year Freedom House Year n R2 m b 
2011 2010 48 0.0489*** -0.1843 4.4895 
Table 1.   Statistical Results of Political Repression vs.  
Number of Peacekeeping Operations 
 
Figure 2.   Effect of Political Repression on Number of Peacekeeping Operations, 
2011 
This graph does have some significance because of the one apparent phenomenon.  


























Combined Freedom House Score (2 to 14) 
Effect of Political Repression on Number of 
Peacekeeping Operations, 2011 
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participated in at least one peacekeeping mission, and of those 13 states, all but Guinea 
Bissau participated in more than one peacekeeping mission.64  Thus, all of these 
moderately repressive regimes share this common trait of wanting to participate in 
peacekeeping.   
Conclusion 1: The level of political repression does not statistically correlate to a 
regime’s participation in a certain number of peacekeeping operations; all moderately 
repressive regimes participate in peacekeeping. 
Victor’s second hypothesis was that political repression would influence the 
number of total peacekeepers contributed by each state.  For the 1981–2001 timeframe, 
Victor’s data was statistically insignificant and he thus came to no conclusion on this 
hypothesis.  The author replicated Victor’s data from 1991–2011 to test Victor’s 
hypothesis with the new expanded data.65 
Hypothesis 2: The level of political repression is correlated to the level of peacekeeping 
participation in a U-shaped curve. 
The independent variable remained the same, the Combined Freedom House 
Score.  The dependent variable was the same as Victor’s, the number of peacekeepers 
contributed to the UN.  That contribution was measured using the “Troops” column on 
the UNPKO spreadsheets for country contributions for each year.  The author also 
included peacekeepers contributed to A.U. operations.  The author did not include 
Military Advisors because they account for less than 2% of all peacekeepers while Police 
account for 15% of all peacekeepers; future research may want to include these two types 
of forces to see if they have any influence on the statistical results. 
I replicated and then updated Victor’s analysis after making three assumptions.  
First, states are constrained in their ability to provide a certain number of peacekeepers 
by the size of their military.  Thus, the author normalized the number of peacekeepers 
contributed by each state against the size of their army to create this fraction: 
                                                 
64 The only other score in which all states participated in at least one peacekeeping mission was 13, in 
which the sample size is merely 2. 
65 UNDPKO does not have the data from the one mission in 1981 and the one mission in 1989, but 
missing two data points from a sample size of 186 should have a negligible effect. 
 25 
Ability to Contribute = (number of peacekeepers contributed) 
    (total number of soldiers in the army) 
The size of the army data comes from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.66   
Second, most Sub-Saharan African states do not participate in peacekeeping 
missions.  The number of states that participate ranges from a low of 2% in 1991 to a 
high of 42% in 2010.  That states do not participate was already determined in the first 
hypothesis; this second hypothesis is determining the level of commitment of the regimes 
that do participate in peacekeeping operations.  To include states that do not send any 
troops would merely supplant the uncertainty of the first hypothesis into the second 
hypothesis.  Of the remaining states, those with a peacekeeper to size of army ratio of less 
than 0.01 were excluded as being merely nominal, instead of substantive, peacekeepers.67  
This leaves a relatively small n, ranging from one state in 1991 to 20 states in 2010, 
which make serious contributions (Peacekeepers/Size of Army > 0.01) to the UN and/or 
A.U.   
The third assumption is that the decision to send peacekeepers on an operation is 
made in advance of those peacekeepers being deployed.  Therefore, the Freedom House 
scores are offset six months prior to the peacekeeper contributions.  For instance, the 
Freedom House report from 2011 (which measures from January 2010 to December 
2010, thereby averages June 2010) is compared to peacekeeping contributions in January 
of 2011.   
Below are the results of the regression analysis.  Like Victor, the original linear 
regression was statistically insignificant.  Thus, the author switched to a polynomial 
regression, which explains African peacekeeping as a U-shaped phenomenon.  The first 
column is the year of contribution, for January of each year.  The second column is the 
year the Freedom House data measures (thus, the 2011 Freedom House report was 
recorded in this column as measuring 2010).  The fourth column is the coefficient of 
                                                 
66 James Hackett, ed., The Military Balance, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: 
Routledge, 2011), 15–163. 
67 For instance, in January of 2011: Chad, Mali and Zimbabwe contributed one peacekeeper; Malawi 
three and Namibia five.  These outliers would skew the results. 
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correlation with corresponding asterisk representing the two-tailed p-values for each 
regression (*p-value < 0.05; **p-value < 0.01; ***p-value < 0.001).  The following three 
columns are the coefficients for the parabolas’ equations (y = ax2 + bx + c).  The third to 
last column is the axis of symmetry, or the x location of the parabola’s vertex (x =  
-a/[2b]).  The second to last column is the y value for the parabola’s vertex (y = a [axis of 
symmetry]2 + b [axis of symmetry] + c).  The final column shows if the parabola opens 
up (so that the parabola looks like a U) or down (so that the parabola looks like an 
upside-down U).  This is based off the sign of the a coefficient from column 5.  The 
results are in Table 2, with year-by-year results from the last eight years on the upper half 
of the table and year groupings (such as the 1990s) on the bottom half. 
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Table 2.   Combined Freedom House Index vs. Number of Peacekeepers/Size of Army 
Combined Freedom House Index vs. Number of Peacekeepers/Size of Army 
CFHI Year PK Year n R2 a b c axis of sym vertex Opens: 
2003 2004 13 ***0.0906 0.0009 -0.0265 0.2105 14.7222 0.0154 up 
2004 2005 14 ***0.1093 -0.0012 -0.0076 0.2155 -3.1667 0.2275 down 
2005 2006 17 ***0.3138 0.0036 -0.0729 0.3964 10.1250 0.0273 up 
2006 2007 18 ***0.3832 0.0057 -0.1111 0.5702 9.7456 0.0288 up 
2007 2008 18 ***0.5338 0.0103 -0.1880 0.8853 9.1262 0.0274 up 
2008 2009 19 ***0.4987 0.0089 -0.1668 0.8091 9.3708 0.0276 up 
2009 2010 20 ***0.4522 0.0133 -0.2283 1.0115 8.5827 0.0318 up 
2010 2011 17 ***0.4440 0.0072 -0.1295 0.6266 8.9931 0.0443 up 
  
1991–2000 1992–2001 39 ***0.0131 0.0002 -0.0053 0.0660 13.2500 0.0308 up 
2001–2010 2002–2011 147 ***0.3035 0.0063 -0.1191 0.6008 9.4523 0.0379 up 
1991–2010 1992–2011 186 ***0.2914 0.0064 -0.1179 0.5807 9.2109 0.0377 up 
2006–2010 2007–2011 91 ***0.4369 0.0088 -0.1606 0.7653 9.1250 0.0325 up 
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This table demonstrates four important conclusions.  First, every coefficient of 
determination is extremely significant (p-value < 0.001), which means this data is not 
coincidental.  Second, all but one of the 12 parabolas open upwards, which means the 
vast majority of the parabolas form a normal U shape.  Third, the 1990s and the 2000s 
show drastically different pictures.  Compare Figure 3 (the graph of the 1990s) to Figure 
4 (the graph of the 2000s). 
 
 
Figure 3.   Effect of Political Repression on Peacekeeping, 1991–2000 
y = 0.0002x2 - 0.0053x + 0.066 
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Figure 4.   Effect of Political Repression on Peacekeeping, 2001–2011 
The 1990s data (which includes the three new assumptions) verifies Victor’s 
analysis from the 1990s.  The parabolic regression is essentially linear due to the 
extremely low a coefficient (0.0002) and the coefficient of correlation is so miniscule 
(0.0131) that this data is statistically insignificant.  In short, in the 1990s, a state’s level of 
political repression had no effect on the state’s level of peacekeeping contribution. In 
comparison, a normal U-shaped curve developed in the 2000s and that regression has a 
coefficient of correlation of 0.3035, meaning 30.35% of a state’s peacekeeping 
contribution in the 2000s can be attributed to its level of repression. 
The final conclusion from this data is that the axis of symmetry converges after 
2006.  The axis of symmetry represents the x value (the Combined Freedom House 
Score) for the lowest point on each parabola (the axis of symmetry is an invisible vertical 
line cut through the center of a U).  This means that as a state moves further to the left or 
right of the axis of symmetry, those states participate at ever more increasing rates.  Each 
year after 2006, the axis barely moves between 8 and 9, meaning the phenomenon is 
becoming consistent.  The axis over the entire 20-year period is barely above 9.  
y = 0.0063x2 - 0.1191x + 0.6008 
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Therefore, the countries that participate the least in peacekeeping are the slightly 
repressive regimes, and the countries that participate the most are those that are not 
repressive at all and those that are moderately repressive. 
The U shape of these graphs is not typical in social science and thus must be 
explained.  The most repressive regimes (approximate score of 12–14) do not participate 
at all in peacekeeping because of internal security problems and because they rely on 
contingent legitimacy.  The immediate goal of these states is consolidating their domestic 
rule based on any type of legitimacy (mostly contingent).  Conversely, the least 
repressive regimes (approximate score of 2–5) contribute the most to peacekeeping 
because they gain the most from international stability.  These least repressive regimes 
are also the regimes with the most structural legitimacy.  The slightly repressive regimes 
(approximate score of 6–8) contribute the least to peacekeeping; these regimes also 
already have some structural legitimacy.  Finally, that leaves the moderately repressive 
regimes, those regimes with a combined Freedom House score between 9 and 11.  These 
are the anomaly regimes that participate in peacekeeping to a greater extent than the 
slightly and highly repressive regimes.  These are the threshold regimes that are 
attempting to transition from contingently legitimate to structurally legitimate in order to 
ensure the continuation of their governments.  They do this by mirroring the actions of 
the structural legitimate regimes. 
U-shaped regressions can be found elsewhere in political science.  For instance, 
compare level of industrialization (x axis) to pollutants emitted annually (y axis).  A  
pre-industrial society is a low polluter, an industrializing society is the highest polluter 
and a post-industrial society is a low polluter.  Finally, a society that has not discovered 
fire will have zero pollutants, just like highly repressive regimes contribute zero 
peacekeepers.  Likewise, happiness indicators (compared to age) are U-shaped 
worldwide.68 
Conclusion 2: Political repression is correlated to the level of peacekeeping participation 
in a U-shaped curve. 
                                                 
68 David Blanchflower and Andrew Oswald, “The U-Bend of Life,” The Economist (16 Dec 2010).  
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Freedom House measures political repression, but that metric does not necessarily 
measure regime legitimacy.  Thus, the Freedom House analysis was necessary to 
replicate other theories but is only the first step in proving the third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The level of structural legitimacy is correlated to the level of peacekeeping 
participation based on a U-shaped curve. 
To measure regime legitimacy, the author used the Polity IV index published by 
the Political Instability Task Force.  This index is widely used to study the effect of 
regime authority on any number of dependent variables.  The scores range from negative 
10 (autocracy) to positive 10 (democracy) and the author argues that negative 10 
represents a perfectly contingently legitimate state while positive 10 represents a 
perfectly structurally legitimate state.  These scores measure executive recruitment, 
constraints on the executive, political competition and changes in governing institutions.  
Running this test, the author used the same three assumptions as described above: 
normalizing the y variable by dividing peacekeeping contribution by size of the army, 
that ratio must be greater than 0.01, and the same six month offset between the 





Table 3.   Polity IV Index vs. Number of Peacekeepers/Size of Army 
Polity IV Index vs. Number of Peacekeepers/Size of Army 
Polity IV Year PK Year n R2 a b c axis of sym vertex Opens: 
2003 2004 13 ***0.0637 0.0015 -0.0026 0.0432 0.8667 0.0421 up 
2004 2005 14 ***0.1640 0.0026 0.0025 -0.0189 -0.4808 -0.0195 up 
2005 2006 17 *0.2483 0.0024 -0.0003 0.0110 0.0625 0.0110 up 
2006 2007 18 **0.2494 0.0025 0.0021 0.0233 -0.4200 0.0229 up 
2007 2008 18 *0.1460 0.0036 -0.0058 0.0224 0.8056 0.0201 up 
2008 2009 19 *0.1505 0.0030 -0.0033 0.0318 0.5500 0.0309 up 
2009 2010 20 *0.1277 0.0035 -0.0060 0.0333 0.8571 0.0307 up 
2010 2011 17 *0.1063 0.0017 -0.0016 0.0646 0.4706 0.0642 up 
  
1991–2000 1992–2001 39 0.0651 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0626 0.6429 0.0629 down 
2001–2010 2002–2011 147 ***0.1178 0.0022 -0.0009 0.0408 0.2045 0.0407 up 
1991–2010 1992–2011 186 ***0.1126 0.0013 0.0034 0.0462 -1.3077 0.0440 up 
2006–2010 2007–2011 91 ***0.1459 0.0028 -0.0029 0.0373 0.5179 0.0365 up 
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This Polity IV table shares many attributes with the Freedom House table.  First, 
in the 1990s, there is no correlation between regime legitimacy and peacekeeping 
contribution.  Second, all of the parabolas in the 2000s are statistically significant and 
open upwards, demonstrating the same relationship as described above between level of 
legitimacy and peacekeeping contributions.  Third, and most importantly, the axis of 
symmetry stays between -1.5 and 1.0.  This means that, once again, the states that have 
the lowest level of participation in peacekeeping are the regimes that are moderately 
legitimate.  Also, regimes with the lowest level of legitimacy do not contribute at all.  
Those that are slightly legitimate contribute to the second highest level.  The graphical 






Figure 5.   Effect of Regime Legitimacy on Level of Participation, 1991–2011 
y = 0.0013x2 + 0.0034x + 0.0462 

































Polity IV Index, 2002-2011 (-10 to 10) 
Effect of Regime Legitimacy on Level of Participation, 
1991-2011 
Contingently    ----------------------------------------------------------------        Structurally  
Legitimate         Legitimate 
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Conclusion 3: Structural legitimacy is correlated to level of peacekeeping participating 
in a U-shaped curve. 
This chapter has presented three hypotheses and conclusions in explanation of 
which type of Sub-sharan african states participate in peacekeeping.  While there is no 
correlation between repression and a state choosing to participate in a certain number of 
missions, there is an anomaly in that all the moderately repressive regimes participate in 
at least one peacekeeping mission (which is not true for any other group of regimes).  
Furthermore, both political repression and regime legitimacy are correlated to the level of 
participation in those missions in a U-shaped curve.  Regimes with low legitimacy and 
high repression do not participate in peacekeeping.  The regimes with moderate 
legitimacy and slight repression participate to the lowest level of those states that 
participate, with the regimes to each side of those participating more; those with high 
legitimacy and low repression participate to the highest level and those that are slightly 
legitimate and moderately repressive participate to the second highest level.  The results 
are illustrated in Table 4.   
 
Level of Participation  High Low Moderate None 
Repression Low Slight Moderate High 
Structural Legitimacy High Moderate Slight Low 
Example Ghana Malawi Rwanda Chad 
Table 4.   Level of Participation vs. Repression and Structural Legitimacy 
The next chapter will explain why regime legitimacy is linked to level of peacekeeping 












IV. RWANDA IN DARFUR 
Throughout May, June and July of 1994, the Interahamwe, a Rwandan 
paramilitary organization dominated by Hutu extremists, committed genocide against at 
least half a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu Rwandans.  After the United Nations 
withdrew its peacekeepers, the invasion of Rwanda by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) was the only means to end the genocide.  Just 10 years after this 
genocide, in May of 2005, Rwanda contributed its first peacekeeper to the United 
Nations.69  Over the next two years, that contribution grew exponentially to over 2,000 
peacekeepers and by January of 2011, Rwanda became the 8th largest contributor of 
peacekeepers in the world.70  Rwanda contributes all of its military peacekeepers to the 
conflict-ridden Sudan, and the vast majority to genocide-prevention duty in Darfur.71  
Rwanda, with a current military size of only 33,000, sends 3,233 peacekeepers to 
the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), an amazing 10.6% of 
its military.72  No other state volunteers such a high percentage of its military to 
peacekeeping in Darfur, and only Nigeria sends more peacekeepers to Darfur (98 more), 
but that numeric superiority represents a mere 3.9% of Nigeria’s much larger military. 
Why does Rwanda volunteer to send such a high percentage of its military to prevent 
genocide in Darfur?  The argument here is that Rwanda participates in peacekeeping in 
Darfur for regime security reasons; the RPF government initially had a small power base 
and is losing any contingent legitimacy it originally had and therefore is using 
peacekeeping for its inherent benefits of gaining structural legitimacy.  Those benefits are 
visible through top-down norm building, economic incentives for the military, treasury 
and populace and good-will in the international community. 
This chapter will analyze why the prevailing theory on why the RPF government 
participates in peacekeeping is incorrect, and then how constructivism and political 
                                                 
69 Beswick, “Peacekeeping, Regime Security,” 744. 
70 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Contributions to United Nations.” 
71 The remainder of RDF peacekeepers are deployed in support of UNMIS. 
72 Hackett, The Military Balance. 
 36 
economy theory better explain the RPF government’s involvement in peacekeeping 
(Note: The acronym “RPF” will denote the pre-1994 movement; “RPF government” will 
denote the current ruling administration; “RDF” will denote the post-1994 military.)  
First, the chapter will dispute the claim that Rwanda participates in peacekeeping merely 
for training its military to fight external or internal threats.  The chapter will show how 
the RPF government takes advantage of bottom-up norm building and institutes top-down 
norm building to highlight its moral superiority to any potential opposition parties.  
Finally, the economic ramifications of peacekeeping, specifically through higher pay for 
soldiers, increased foreign direct investment and higher foreign aid, further legitimize the 
rule of the RPF party. 
A. WHY TRAINING IS NOT THE EXPLANATION 
One contested explanation for Rwanda’s involvement in peacekeeping is free 
training and experience for the RDF so that the military can protect the RPF government 
from external or domestic threats.  The RPF government is not looking for ways in which 
to train its soldiers.  The RPF government fears political dissent and especially electoral 
defeat; the RPF government demonstrates this fear by undermining opposition parties, 
imprisoning opposition leaders and manipulating elections.  The RPF government also 
fears widespread internal discontent leading to collective acts of violence.  However, the 
RPF government does not recognize any external or internal military threats to its rule. 
The only realistic external threat to the RPF government is from aggressor groups 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but in 2011, the RPF government no 
longer recognizes a threat to the survival of their regime from these groups.  The Armée 
pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR) was a surviving Hutu Power aggressor group 
formed by the remnants of the FAR and Interhamwe who fled Rwanda to eastern DRC 
after the 1994 civil war.  Initially, the goal of the ALiR was to destroy the RPF 
government in Kigali and install a pro-Hutu government.  In 1996, and again in 1998, the 
RPF government viewed the ALiR as a threat to the RPF’s survival and, for this reason, 
invaded the DRC twice.  By 2002, the ALiR had merged with another Hutu Power 
aggressor group, the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), thereby 
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creating an army with a combined strength of over 15,000 combatants.73  Yet that year 
the RPF government no longer felt threatened and ordered the RDF to leave the DRC.  
The difference between 1996 and 2002 was the intent of the ALiR and FDLR.  The RDF 
left the DRC because the FDLR had transitioned from an anti-RPF militia to a criminal 
organization, profiting from selling gold, cassiterite and coltan (the final two minerals are 
rare earth elements used in electronics).  The International Crisis Group asserts that “the 
FDLR has become more concerned with extortion and selling minerals than destabilizing 
Rwanda” and also states that Rwanda is under no military pressure from the FDLR.74  
This transition from an ideology-based group to criminality has eroded FDLR 
membership more than the RDF was ever capable of; as of late 2007, FDLR membership 
fell below 7,000 militants.75   
The weakening of the aggressor militias in the DRC has been combined with RPF 
government actions that showcase how little the RPF government feels militarily 
threatened.  States that feel military threatened do not decrease the size of their military; 
as an example, the U.S. government drastically downsized after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, and then re-energized its military after the September 11 terrorist attacks.  In 
comparison, since 1994, the RPF government has decreased the size of the RDF by over 
40,000 members.  In the late 1990s, almost 19,000 FAR and RDF soldiers were 
demobilized, followed by 20,000 RDF members in the early 2000s after the withdrawal 
from the DRC.  Finally, just last year, the RPF government decided to demobilize yet 
another 4,000 RDF members, resulting in the military numbering less than 30,000 
personnel.  A state that feels threatened does not demobilize 57% of its armed forces.  
The RPF government is not threatened by militant external groups, and internal ethnic 
problems are unsolvable with military means.   
If a strong military insurgency began inside Rwandan borders, the RDF would be 
incapable of stopping it because of the way in which the RPF waged the 1990–1994 civil 
                                                 
73 International Crisis Group, “Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu,” Africa Report 133 (31 October 
2007): 27. 
74 Ibid., 28. 
75 Ibid., 27. 
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war and the military considerations of ethnic wars.  The way in which the RPF waged 
their war against the Habyarimana regime resulted in low politicization of the peasantry 
and a narrow political base.  The widely-respected (in the RPF ranks) commander of the 
RPF, Fred Rwigyema, was killed in the first week of the war and was replaced by the 
untested Paul Kagame.  After initial setbacks, Kagame reformed the RPF into a guerrilla 
group that over the next three years fought the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR, from the 
French spelling) to a stalemate.76  During this stalemate, the RPF did not create 
administrative structures in captured territory to increase their political support; instead, 
the RPF displaced the local population in order to halt farming in an attempt to increase 
the financial costs for the Habyarimana regime.77  According to Cyrus Reed, “The RPF's 
unconventional guerrilla strategy was accompanied by the large-scale flight of the 
peasantry, rather than their politicization.”78  This strategy of increasing the financial 
costs to the Habyarimana regime likewise resulted in increasing the political costs to the 
RPF since 95% of Rwandans are peasants who work in agriculture.  This lack of 
politicization of the peasantry exactly contradicts the successful strategy of Mao Zedong 
in China.  However, for the short-term, the military successes of the RPF outweighed the 
political failures, and by August of 1993 both parties signed the Arusha Accords that 
outlined a joint Hutu/Tutsi transitional government, multiparty elections in 1995 and the 
integration of the RPF into the FAR.79  The RPF had won military victory but politically 
had no chance of winning a large portion of the vote in 1995.   
The shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane and the quickness of the RPF victory 
in the ensuing civil war ensured that an RPF government would be unable to increase 
their political base.  On 6 April 1994, Habyarimana’s plane was shot down and within 
hours, the Interahamwe began the genocide and set siege to a battalion of RPF soldiers 
who were in Kigali in terms with the Arusha Accords.  On 8 April 1994, the RPF began 
                                                 
76 United States Department of Defense, “Rwanda: The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s Offensive,” Defense 
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77 Cyrus Reed, “The Rwandan Patriotic Front: Politics and Development in Rwanda,” A Journal of 
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79 United States Department of Defense, “Rwanda: The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s Offensive,” 3. 
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its invasion of Rwanda with 15,000 soldiers against the FAR’s 39,000 soldiers.80  In just 
4 days, the RPF won control of the entire northern half of the country and linked up with 
its besieged battalion in Kigali.81  An armistice was declared after another month of 
fighting.  Figure 6 is a map of the RPF invasion and land control as 9 May 1994.  Notice 
how much land the RPF captured in just a few days of fighting. 
 
 
Figure 6.   RPF Offensive Thrusts and Occupied Territory as of 9 May 199482 
In just four days, the RPF suddenly had to govern half the country.  However, the 
RPF waged this part of the war no differently than previous parts and thus again limited 
its potential political base.  The RPF was immediately presented with the problem that 
the North was historically the most anti-Tutsi part of Rwanda.83  Then, according to a 
                                                 
80 34,000 of the FAR soldiers were poorly trained due to quick conscription during the civil war; 
United States Department of Defense, 3. 
81 United States Department of Defense, “Rwanda,” 4. 
82 United States Department of Defense, “Rwanda,” 6. 
83 Reed, “The Rwandan Patriotic Front: Politics and Development in Rwanda,” 49. 
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declassified U.S. Defense Department intelligence report from 9 May 1994, the areas 
controlled by the RPF were entirely empty of civilians either because of fleeing or forced 
migration by the RPF.84  Furthermore, the parts of the country that the RPF controlled 




Figure 7.   Population Density of Rwanda, 199885 
Recall that the entire northeastern section, symbolized by the lightest color 
(meaning least dense) was the area controlled by the RPF.  Reed declares about the 
manner of the war, “Because of the massive displacement of the local population during 
the war, the RPF did not effectively expand its base through the political activities which 
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normally accompany guerrilla warfare.”86 Thus, by July, when the RPF took Kigali and 
effectively ended the genocide, the Tutsi-led force took control of a country in which the 
party’s only support was for ending the genocide.  Even the U.S. Defense Department 
intelligence report prior to the RPF’s final offensive assessed that the RPF would have to 
return to the bargaining table because of its “narrow political base” a base that was 
established in the minority Tutsi community, and more specifically, in only those Tutsis 
who had lived in exile.87  The RPF was able to win a military victory over the militant 
Interahamwe forces when the RPF was the aggressor, but a future ethnic war or 
insurgency would have to be conducted differently with the RPF government now as the 
defender. 
To win an ethnic war or insurgency, the military must have enough personnel to 
control the population and land.  According to the US Army Field Manual and RAND 
analyst James Quinlivan, a successful counterinsurgency operation requires 20 to 25 
soldiers per 1,000 residents.88  Rwanda has a population of ten million people and the 
RDF will number less than 30,000 by the end of this year; this means the RDF has only 
three soldiers per 1,000 residents (or between 17 and 22 less than recommended by 
American counterinsurgency doctrine).  Even excluding the Tutsi and Twa ethnicities, 
the RDF only increases its ratio of soldiers per 1,000 Hutu residents to 3.5.  Furthermore, 
95% of the rural population is Hutu and therefore much more spread out over farmland 
than in the denser cities.  In an ethnic war, controlling the population depends on 
controlling territory.89  Rwanda is 26,338 square kilometers in total area, meaning the 
RDF has just over one soldier per square kilometer of land.   
More important than the RDF’s inability to fight an insurgency is their realization 
of this; the RDF has continued to decrease its size since the RPF government came to 
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power.  A military that feels threatened does not demobilize its trained combatants.90  
Thus, the RPF government understands that it cannot allow the situation to reach a 
military climax.  Joel Barkan and David Gordan assert that “In Rwanda, prospects for 
stability turn on whether Kagame's Tutsi-based minority regime can deal with the Hutu 
majority politically rather than militarily.”91  This is exactly why the RPF government 
has been so politically repressive; the RPF government recognizes the only threat it can 
stop is in the political realm.  Thus, the decreasing size of the RDF military illustrates that 
the RPF government is not peacekeeping to train a military that it knows would be 
incapable of stopping an internal insurgency; instead, peacekeeping is being conducted 
for the political and economic benefits so that an insurgency never begins.   
B. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST EXPLANATION OF PEACEKEEPING 
Constructivism can explain how the RPF government gains domestic and 
international legitimacy through peacekeeping.  The 1994 genocide so altered Rwandan 
society that the norms of the society changed to the point that Rwandans want to stop 
other genocides.  Meanwhile, through top-down norm building, the RPF government is 
cementing these norms into society through rhetoric that supports peacekeeping.  Both of 
these types of norm formation influence, and are influenced by, the norms of the 
international system.  Through bottom-up and top-down norm building, the RPF 
government can legitimize itself internally as a genocide-preventer, and through the 
international system the RPF government can legitimize itself externally as a force that 
leads progressive missions. 
Bottom-up norm building occurs as societies change, sometimes due to dramatic 
events, which creates incentives for the ruling parties to alter their actions.  Ideas such as 
culture, norms and identity are unfortunately extremely difficult to measure scientifically.  
One of the few metrics for measuring these ideas is through public opinion polls, which 
are entirely absent in the case of how the Rwandan populace views peacekeeping in 
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Darfur.  Another, less objective measure, is through opinion columns in local 
newspapers, which should represent, at the very least, the views of the intellectual elite.   
Unfortunately, most media outlets in Rwanda are state owned and some that claim 
to be independent are also state owned.  The most controversial of these is the largest 
English-language newspaper, The New Times, which claims to be independently-owned.  
However, after a New Times editorial accused Human Rights Watch of supporting 
genocide doubters, Human Rights Watch claimed that The New Times was state owned.92  
Human Rights Watch’s accusation is questionable as this was the first major accusation 
of state-ownership against The New Times and the allegation was in response to a 
devastating editorial against Human Rights Watch.  The Rwandan Focus is a smaller 
English-language newspaper that claims independence, and has yet to be accused of 
being state-owned by any reputable source.   
Thus, we are left to rely on the rhetoric of public officials and these newspapers, 
the true independence of which no one can be certain.  President Paul Kagame asserts 
that Rwandans are capable of bottom-up norm building and have already changed since 
the genocide; claiming, “One would be making a very serious mistake to ignore the level 
of maturity that has been reached in the [reconciliation] process by our people.”93  
Kagame’s declaration is not surprising and may not be credible, but logically his 
statement corroborates that Rwandans, like all people, are capable of change and 
therefore capable of changing their norms and interests.  That interests can change is the 
central precept of constructivism and therefore an underlying assumption of this thesis.   
As for opinion pieces in the media, The Rwandan Focus declared immediately 
following the first deployment of RDF peacekeepers to Darfur, that Rwanda “has a moral 
obligation to stand up when genocide is happening, based on its own history.”94  This is a 
perfect example of bottom-up constructivism; the Rwandan genocide dramatically 
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changed the populace of Rwanda so that those same people now support preventing 
genocide throughout the continent.  Likewise, an editorial in The New Times asserted that 
Rwandan “participation in peacekeeping operations is mainly motivated by the need to 
take responsibility as an active member of the international community.”95  Thus, 
Rwandans have expanded their sense of ‘We’ to include other members of the 
international community who the Rwandans feel they are responsible for protecting.  If 
this is true, then the RPF government is responding to the interests of its citizens by 
peacekeeping in Darfur; if this is not true, then the RPF government is being proactive by 
attempting to force these norms onto society.  To reiterate, bottom-up norm building is 
extremely difficult to measure and thus, the remainder of this chapter instead focuses on 
how the RPF government takes advantage of changing norms. 
Top-down norm creation in Rwandan can best be seen through the rhetoric of the 
RPF government.  This begins from the very top in Kagame’s belief that the leaders of 
Rwanda can influence the society’s norms, 
Leadership is very important in everything. Leaders led our people to kill 
each other, to have genocide in this country that took a million lives of our 
people. But leadership that is determined to change that course will also 
succeed with the same people, and that is what we are experiencing under 
a different leadership that values the people of this country irrespective of 
their background, and rallying them for a common cause of building a new 
nation of Rwanda.96 
The RPF government’s internal legitimacy is derived from the moral authority of 
the RPF ending the 1994 genocide.  The RPF government continually uses the genocide 
as propaganda to remind the populace of the RPF government’s moral authority.  For 
example, the RPF government uses the annual genocide commemorations as propaganda 
stunts to convert personal remembrance into collective sorrow.97  This extends to foreign 
affairs, in which one could argue that the RPF government takes the lead in UNAMID to 
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show how Rwanda has become a moral authority in Africa.  In the word of Rwanda’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rosemary Museminali, Rwanda’s “involvement in Darfur 
reflects the Rwandan regime’s belief that preventing genocide is the responsibility of 
every state.”98  In short, the regime reminds the populace of the RPF government’s moral 
authority and strengthens its legitimacy by stopping genocide throughout Africa.99   
Danielle Beswick sums up this top-down norm building by the RPF government 
to create regime legitimacy, “The crucial role of the RPF in ending the 1994 genocide 
provides the bedrock of the legitimacy and moral authority of the ruling regime, and the 
decision to provide troops for peacekeeping in the specific case of Darfur reinforces this 
moral authority.”100  To clarify, Rwanda only has military peacekeepers in Darfur, a 
neighboring African country that experienced genocide, and not in countries that 
experienced general conflict.  The RPF government does not just take advantage of 
domestic norms, but also international norms.  
The RPF government utilizes international norms of genocide-prevention and 
peacekeeping to increase its structural legitimacy, and also its hard power.  International 
donors, specifically in the West, reward states that assist in strengthening international 
security.101 However, since 1994, the Rwandan government has been highly criticized for 
the way it handles external security matters. This is especially true of the two invasions of 
the DRC. At the same time, the regime has capitalized on its moral high ground and 
circumvented sanctioning by the international community, which has patiently been 
waiting to see if the RPF government can produce a stable state.102  One hallmark of such 
a stabilizing state is becoming an exporter of security.  Thus, peacekeeping is an attempt 
by the RPF government to rehabilitate its image after the DRC incursions and secure its 
place in the international community.103  Kagame clearly stated this strategy of adhering 
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to, and even leading, the worldwide norm of sustainable peace at a 2006 speech at 
Princeton University, “Unrelenting engagement with fellow Africans and the 
international community for sustainable peace…must remain the core of our agenda.”104  
This strategy has paid dividends for the regime. 
International leaders, who just a few years ago criticized the RDF as an 
illegitimate occupying force in the DRC, are now applauding that same military.  During 
a UN General Assembly Meeting in September of 2009, President Barack Obama praised 
the RDF for its role in UNAMID and described the RDF’s accomplishments as 
“remarkable.”105  The Senior Social Development Advisor for the United Kingdom’s 
Department for International Development in Kigali, Judy Walker, described the RDF’s 
involvement in UNAMID as “an encouraging sign of Rwanda’s transition to become a 
force for peace in the region.”106  In testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, Michael Arietti, praised the RPF government for 
its involvement in UNAMID and assured the U.S. Senate that the United States 
government supported the RPF government’s efforts.  Arietti testified, “I want to stress 
how important it is that Rwanda, which was itself a victim of genocide, could contribute 
1,800 soldiers to end genocide in Darfur…The United States strongly supports this effort 
and has also contributed technical and logistical support to ensure the Rwandans 
constitute an effective peacekeeping force in Darfur.”107  Recently, foreign military 
assistance has been focused on increasing the RDF’s ability to train other African 
militaries, thereby increasing the power of the RPF government by taking on the role of 
the budget-strapped West while also strengthening the RPF government’s relations with 
its neighbors. 
In August of 2009, a 21-member American advisory team, led by USAF General 
Joseph Ashy, studied the Rwandan military to explore how to increase cooperation 
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between the two militaries.  According to a Rwandan news source, Ashy commended the 
RPF government for its peacekeeping operations, which placed the interests of the people 
first.108  Less than a year later, Catherine Wiesner, the Principal Director of African 
Affairs in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, declared, “Rwanda has been such a 
great example in building an indigenous peacekeeping capability and, we were talking 
about how to build on that, to build better capabilities in the region.”109  The first 
proposal to build better capabilities was to place the training hub for the peacekeeping-
oriented East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) at the Rwandan Military Academy in 
Gako.110  The RDF took the first step to this goal when in August of 2008 the RDF held a 
peacekeeping meeting in Kigali that attracted representatives from 26 African 
militaries.111  The RPF government is also interested in expanding the Gishali Police 
Training School in Rwamagana to become a regional peacekeeping hub that would train 
400 Rwandan and 100 international police officers for peacekeeping missions each 
year.112  Thus, the RPF government has taken the first steps to create long-term, 
internationally-respected, regional peacekeeping institutions inside Rwanda to further 
increase their structural legitimacy.  Through these actions the RPF government increases 
its moral legitimacy internationally, and likewise, through peacekeeping the RPF 
government increases the hard power of Rwanda. 
In 2010, the RPF government threatened to pull its 3,300 peacekeepers out of 
Darfur because of a controversial United Nations report.  In September of 2010, a 
preliminary report from the UN High Commission for Human Rights titled, “Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003: Report of the Mapping Exercise” was leaked to the 
international press.  The report’s findings outright accused the RDF and the RPF 
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government-backed Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo 
(AFDL) of genocide against Hutu refugees in the DRC.113  The UN High Commission 
for Human Rights conducted this mapping exercise by interviewing 1,280 witnesses and 
collecting 1,500 documents resulting in finding 600 incidents of violence (the vast 
majority not being genocide-related), each incident had to be confirmed by a least two 
independent sources.114  The initial mapping exercise claimed to confirm genocide in the 
Congolese provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Orientale and Maniema from October 
1996 to August 1997, places in which the RDF and ADLR forces made no distinction 
between genocidaires (the RDF claimed to be in the DRC to destroy the Interahamwe 
ALiR militia) and civilians, regardless of age or sex.115  The report describes the actions 
of the ADLR and RDF (abbreviated by the United Nations in its French form of APR in 
this passage): 
Attacks resulted in a very large number of victims, probably tens of 
thousands of members of the Hutu ethnic group, all nationalities 
combined. In the vast majority of cases reported, it was not a question of 
people killed unintentionally in the course of combat, but people targeted 
primarily by AFDL/APR forces and executed in their hundreds, often with 
edged weapons. The majority of the victims were children, women, 
elderly people and the sick, who posed no threat to the attacking forces.116 
The edged weapons mentioned in this paragraph imply primarily hammers, and 
the use of such weapons is evidence that the deaths of these bystanders were not 
collateral damage from fighting between the RDF/ADLR and ALiR. 117  Specifically, the 
massacres in Rutshuru, on 30 October 1996, and Mugago, on 18 November 1996, 
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demonstrate that the RDF and ADLR were targeting Hutus; survivors told the UN 
commission that they survived because they convinced the RDF and ADLR that they 
were not Hutu.118  The final conclusion of the report accused the RDF of genocide, “It 
seems possible to infer a specific intention on the part of certain AFDL/APR 
commanders to partially destroy the Hutus in the DRC, and therefore to commit a crime 
of genocide, based on their conduct, words and the damning circumstances of the acts of 
violence committed by the men under their command.”119   
If this report is correct, it undermines the entire external legitimacy of the RDF 
that the regime has been attempting to repair through peacekeeping. 120  A summary of 
the report, presented to the UN General Assembly succinctly declared, “The report 
questioned the moral status of a government previously assured global sympathy.”121  
The RPF government’s response to the report was as expected, and the UN counter 
response demonstrates how much hard power the RPF government has gained through 
peacekeeping. 
The RPF government lambasted the report as poorly researched and immoral, and 
made very specific threats regarding the report’s official release.  The RPF government 
noted that the report admitted its methods were not stringent enough to be presented in a 
court of law or to meet academic standards.  Furthermore, the RPF government argued 
that the report was biased because the researchers of the report met with over 200 NGOs, 
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but never spoke with a single Rwandan government official.122  The Rwandan 
government’s spokesperson, Ben Rutsinga asserted:  
It is immoral and unacceptable that the United Nations, an organization 
that failed outright to prevent genocide in Rwanda and the subsequent 
refugees crisis that is the direct cause for so much suffering in Congo and 
Rwanda, now accuses the army that stopped the genocide of committing 
atrocities in the Democratic Republic of Congo.123   
While all of these counters have merit, the report likely would have been 
published in its entirety in spite of the RPF government’s moral and fairness based 
objections.  However, the bombshell counter by the RPF government showed that 
Rwanda uses its peacekeepers as political pawns in international affairs to gain hard 
power.  The Rwandan Foreign Minister, Louise Mushikiwabo, declared in a letter to the 
UN Secretary General, Ban ki-Moon, just days after the leaking of the unofficial report, 
“Attempts to take action on this report—either through its release or leaks to the media—
will force us to withdraw Rwanda’s various commitments to the United Nations, 
especially in the area of peacekeeping.”124  The final report was amended to omit the 
accusation of genocide against the RDF and ADLR.  The RPF government successfully 
used its peacekeepers as both examples of moral superiority, and devices to gain hard 
power.  They are further used to reap economic benefits. 
C. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATION OF PEACEKEEPING 
Peacekeeping positively impacts the economy of the state that is volunteering 
peacekeepers.  The Rwandan economy is small, with a GDP of only $5.064 billion, and is  
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lacking in development, with an UNHDI below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (and 
ranked 152 out of 168 countries, worldwide).125  Therefore, the RPF government seeks 
ways in which to increase economic growth to secure its structural legitimacy; one 
manner is peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping benefits the individual soldier through higher pay 
from the United Nations, it benefits the family and community of the soldier through 
remittances, it benefits the state through foreign reserves and it benefits the economy as a 
whole through foreign aid and foreign investment.  All of these benefits are seen as a 
result of quality foreign policy by the RPF government and thus, the economic benefits of 
peacekeeping result in political benefits to the RPF government.   
Learning from Machiavelli’s quote that “Money…is most necessary in a 
secondary place; but this necessity good soldiers will always be able to supply,” the RPF 
government uses its military to finance the state.  In the late 1990s, shortly after the RPF 
government came to power, the RDF twice invaded what is now the DRC.  The goal of 
the first invasion was to destroy the FAR and Interahamwe forces that had fled to 
neighboring Zaire (now called DRC) and formed the ALiR aggressor group and the 
stated goal of the second invasion remained the same.  However, according to the United 
Nations Security Council’s “Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo,” the goal of the RPF government in the DRC was to secure 
property, specifically rare earth elements.126  In 1999 alone, Rwanda is estimated to have 
profited US$250 million from its mining, trade and smuggling of Congolese coltan, 
diamonds, gold and timber.127  Meanwhile, in the midst of this war, military expenditures 
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were only 4.2% of a GDP of $1.797 billion, equaling $75.5 million.128  Thus, the RDF 
made $175 million in profits for the regime; the entire budget for the Rwandan 
government in 1999 was only $319 million!129  Furthermore, due to the professionalism 
of the RDF, private profiteering by individual soldiers from this plundering was limited, 
and instead mainly benefited the state.130  However, with the signing of the Pretoria 
Accord in July of 2002, Rwanda agreed to have the RDF leave the DRC, and therefore 
the RDF lost the manner in which it funded itself; the RDF needed to find a new, 
internationally-respected manner in which to fund itself so that it would not be a drain on 
Rwanda’s budget.  
Less than three years later, the RDF began peacekeeping in Darfur.  For the entire 
year of 2010, the United Nations paid Rwanda $47.5 million for its 3,667 peacekeepers in 
Sudan; the Rwandan military spent $49.4 million on employee costs in 2010, less than $2 
million more than the United Nations gave Rwanda for peacekeeping.131  That UN 
money can be spent in one of three ways, as previously described in the literature review.  
In the first scenario, the government can pocket all of the UN stipend and only pay the 
soldier’s their normal base salary.  In the second scenario, the government can pay the 
soldiers their normal salary and the entire UN stipend (as is the UN’s expectation).  In the 
third scenario, the government can pay the soldiers their normal salary and some of the 
UN stipend.   
Most countries pick the third scenario, but there is little data on which option 
Rwanda has taken.  Geofrey Mugumya, the African Union Director of Peace and Security 
argues that most African states pick this option so that their soldiers in harm’s way 
receive some extra pay, but also the central government has left over UN money to pay 
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the remainder of the military that is not deployed.132  As for the RDF specifically, 
according to the one source that discusses this issue, the Sudan Tribune, in July of 2007, 
“The actual amount allocated to each [RDF] soldier was being cut by the RDF.”133  
Logically, the RPF government has most likely chosen this third scenario so that the 
peacekeepers receive their normal salary and only some of the UN stipend, while the RPF 
leadership uses the remainder to offset a lower budget for the RDF.  Therefore, the author 
will assume that the RPF government gives its peacekeepers all of their monthly pay but 
only some of the UN monthly stipend.  Thus, what are the benefits for the RPF 
government in giving some of the UN stipend to the peacekeepers in Darfur while 
keeping the rest for the state treasury? 
The first benefit is keeping the military subservient to a political leader that is not 
especially well-respected by the RDF rank and file, and even disliked by most of the RDF 
leadership.  In an interview with the English-language Rwandan newspaper The 
Newsline, an unnamed RDF intelligence officer explains Kagame’s relationship with the 
RDF, “Kagame was never popular among the RDF officers in 1990, when he took over. 
He was pushed at the top by [Ugandan President Yoweri] Museveni and [Ugandan 
General] Salim Saleh and the soldiers accepted him for the common good…[Kagame] 
has been dividing the RDF year after year.”134  Furthermore, the RDF leadership has 
become emboldened as of late; in April of 2010, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 
General Charles Muhire and the Deputy Commander of UNAMID, Emmanuel Karake, 
publicly challenged Kagame’s foreign and domestic policies.135  In the same report, the 
RDF leaders allege, in reference to the second invasion of the DRC, 
President Kagame is, in practice, a callous and reckless leader.  His 
decisions, even on issues which have grave implications, are often driven, 
more than anything else, by his greed for absolute power.  President 
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Kagame often makes mistakes of phenomenal proportions which lead to 
dire consequences for the people of Rwanda.”136   
How, therefore, does Kagame keep the RDF subservient to him, the party and the state? 
The RDF is well paid, and receives extra pay through peacekeeping to keep 
them compliant to Kagame, despite the dislike of the senior ranks for the leader.  In 
2009, according to the United States Department of State, Rwanda’s GDP per capital 
was $510 a year.137  However, as demonstrated by an extremely high Gini coefficient 
(of inequality) of 0.467 for 2006 (the last year of available data), the State 
Department supplied GDP per capita can be assumed to be much higher than the 
median GDP per capita.138  To further highlight this difference in median GDP per 
capita, 76.56% of Rwandans live under the UNHDI’s poverty line of $0.58 
(Purchasing Power Parity $1.25) a day.139  That equates to earning $208.33 a year.  In 
comparison, the average RDF soldier earns $137 a month in base pay, or $1,644 a 
year.140  The high level of pay for military soldiers in Rwanda is best demonstrated by 
the two dearming, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs in the 1990s and 
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2000s through which many soldiers became farmers, which represented both 
downward social and economic movement in Rwanda culture.141   
Although the base pay for RDF soldiers is high in comparison to the populace, the 
RPF government and Kagame still feel threatened by their own instrument of coercive 
power.  A way in which to gain military support, while also gaining domestic support 
from military family members is through low-intensity peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping in 
Darfur is a very low-intensity conflict that results in few deaths but some economic 
benefits to individual soldiers (albeit we do not know what exact percentage of the UN 
stipend individual peacekeeper receive).  In the five years that Rwanda has been in 
Darfur, 19 Rwandan peacekeepers have been killed, most in accidents.  Based on the 
average number of RDF soldiers in Darfur in the five years 2006–2010, the chance of an 
RDF soldier being killed in support of UNAMID per year is a mere 0.12%.142  In 
comparison, the chance of a NATO soldier being killed in support of Operation Enduring 
Freedom in 2010 was almost five times that, at 0.54%.143  
In compensation for peacekeeping, the United Nations pays Rwanda $1080 per 
soldier per month.  Using the assumption from earlier, that the treasury is keeping a 
percentage of this money and giving the remainder to the soldiers in the field, the RPF 
government can further incentivize the military to support the party.  Not only are RDF 
soldiers already paid more than their civilian counterparts, but whatever extra money they 
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are given by the RPF government for peacekeeping further increases this level of 
inequality in their favor.  Since RDF soldiers deploy for one-year peacekeeping stints, 
and the RDF has deployed a total of 14,908 of its 33,000 strong force, presumably 45.2% 
of the Rwandan military has benefitted from peacekeeping pay.144  Thus, peacekeeping 
benefits the individual soldier with little threat to his life. 
Peacekeeping also benefits the family of the individual soldier, and the 
community where the soldier’s family lives, through remittances.  Although we do not 
know how much of the soldier’s paychecks are being remitted, logically, much of the 
base pay and UN stipend must be remitted to family members in Rwanda.  RDF soldiers 
are earning their paycheck and UN stipend in a region of Sudan that does not have the 
economic infrastructure to facilitate RDF soldiers being able to spend much of that 
money.  Family members who are the recipients of their military member’s remittances 
benefit from Rwanda peacekeeping, thus family members are benefitting from the RPF 
government’s foreign policy.  When those family members spend that money in the 
community, individuals in the community also benefit from the RPF government’s 
peacekeeping policy.  Therefore, the Rwandan populace in this sense supports 
peacekeeping because of the low-level (on the individual scale) economic benefit, and 
these people support the RPF government because of the RPF government’s foreign 
policy that is good for these beneficiaries (see Appendix A to see a graph of remittances 
since 1994).   
Regardless of how much of the UN stipend the RPF government gives to its 
soldiers the state treasury still benefits from handling American dollars.  Rwanda has a 
huge import/export gap that it can only sustain with high levels of foreign reserves, some 
of which they get from peacekeeping.  In 2010 alone, Rwanda imported $1.047 billion 
worth of imports but only exported $226 million, resulting in an export deficit of $821 
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million, in an economy only valued at $5.064 billion.145  The current account deficit 
alone is $489 million and is predicted to remain over 5.1% of GDP until at least 2015.146  
The RPF government’s foreign reserves have precipitously decreased throughout the 
second half of the 2000s and thus the RPF government must find a way to increase those 
reserves; peacekeeping is part of this foreign reserve stream.  The UN pays the Rwandan 
treasury the peacekeeper stipends in American dollars, which the treasury keeps and then 
pays the peacekeepers their stipend in Rwandan Francs (RWF).  This process alone gave 
the treasury $47.5 million in the reserve currency of the world in 2010 (see Appendix B 
to see a graph of foreign reserves since 1994).   
Rwanda receives foreign aid for appearing to be the stabilizing peacekeeper in the 
Great Lakes region.  Rwanda is heavily dependent on foreign aid (i.e. in 2010, foreign aid 
accounted for 25% of Rwanda’s GDP and 42.8% of state revenue) so the RPF 
government has been doing everything in its power to increase aid.147  Since 2005, when 
Rwanda began peacekeeping, Rwanda has experienced a correlating and exponential 
increase in foreign aid.148  This increase is not surprising since the RPF government has a 
history of altering its behavior to match international norms in order to increase aid from 
the West; transitioning from invader to peacekeeper is an extreme example of altering 
behavior to prey on norms to gain aid (see Appendix C to see a graph of foreign aid since 
1994). 
RPF-led Rwanda fell out of grace with the international donor community in the 
early 2000s but is now receiving more foreign aid than ever before.  In 2002, the United 
States blocked the IMF’s “Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility” disbursement to 
Rwanda because of the RDF’s invasion of the DRC; in response, the RDF immediately 
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left the DRC.149  Within five years, the RPF government had transitioned from an 
international pariah party stealing resources from the DRC to a regional peacekeeper, 
earning monetary resources from the United Nations.  In response to this turnaround the 
United States added Rwanda to the Millennium Challenge Account in which the United 
States granted Rwanda a $24.73 million threshold grant.  In short, international 
credibility of the RPF government is enhanced by becoming a leader in one of the West’s 
most lofty norms, peacekeeping to prevent genocide.  That credibility due to 
peacekeeping also helps attract foreign investment. 
Recent surges in FDI are greatly responsible for recent surges in GDP growth.  
The RPF government has likewise been modifying its behavior to attract FDI.  The RPF 
government has changed its foreign policy image to the world.  By altering its actions 
from international de-stabilizer to exporter of security to East Africa, the RPF 
government limits uncertainty and attracts investors.  There was once again a correlating 
and exponential increase in FDI after Rwanda began peacekeeping in 2005.  FDI in 2005 
was less than $15 million, and by 2008 reached over $105 million.  This FDI led to 
economic growth, 11.2% growth in 2008 alone.  Peacekeeping again positively impact 
the lives of Rwandan by increasing FDI and thus growth rates.  Although the Rwandan 
farmer likely will not link economic growth to the RPF government’s peacekeeping, the 
farmer will link economic growth to the RPF government’s good governance in general 
and thus the benefits to the RPF government, regime legitimacy, are the same regardless 
of the farmer’s understanding of why the growth occurred (see Appendix D for FDI since 
1994). 
D. CONCLUSION: PEACEKEEPING FOR REGIME-LEGITIMACY 
This chapter explored the benefits for Rwanda’s participation in UN 
peacekeeping, and peacekeeping in UNAMID specifically.  The argument that Rwanda 
uses peacekeeping as a training mechanism cannot be accurate; the RPF government does 
not see itself threatened militarily either internally or externally, as evidenced by the 
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constantly decreasing size of its military.  Instead, the RPF government fears political 
threats.  Thus, the RPF government recognizes political threats to its hegemony and 
counters those threats through both political repression of opposition parties and through 
good governance, including peacekeeping. 
Peacekeeping politically benefits the RPF government through the RPF 
government’s claims of moral superiority.  The RPF government uses the ever-adapting 
norms of the Rwandan populace, specifically that Rwanda should become a protector 
because of the horrors of the genocide, to increase its structural legitimacy.  The RPF 
government entrenches those norms into society by constantly reminding the populace 
that the RPF government stopped the genocide in Rwanda and now is stopping the 
genocide in Darfur.  Furthermore, the RPF government takes advantage of international 
norms to change its image from that of a regional destabilizing force to that of a preventer 
of genocide.  This increases the legitimacy of the RPF government internationally, be it 
in the rhetoric of American politicians, or through the building of regional peacekeeping 
institutions in Rwanda.  Finally, the RPF government uses its peacekeepers to gain hard 
power by threatening to leave Darfur if the UN undermines the RPF government’s moral 
legitimacy.   
The RPF government also benefits economically by helping the Rwandan 
populace.  The RPF government ensures the subservience of the military by paying the 
soldiers more than they could expect to make in the largely agrarian economy.  On top of 
that, the RPF government gives the soldiers extra money for conducting a relatively safe 
duty for a year.  This extra money is sent home, through remittances, which benefit the 
soldiers’ families and the overall community.  Meanwhile, the state treasury increases its 
foreign reserves and the RPF government uses the remainder of the UN stipends to fund 
the military.  Also, because the RPF government has shown itself to be a benevolent actor 
in international affairs, foreign aid and FDI have poured into the African state more than 
ever before.  All of these consequences of peacekeeping benefit people individually and 
the economy as a whole, which further legitimizes the ruling party domestically. 
Expect Rwanda to participate in peacekeeping missions when the missions serve 
to legitimize the RPF government both internationally and domestically.  While the 
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economic benefits of peacekeeping are substantial, the RPF government will never admit 
it participates in peacekeeping for that reason.  Instead, the RPF government claims it 
only engages in peacekeeping because of its moral authority and responsibility to protect, 
a responsibility the RPF government had to first take on in 1994 when the RPF stopped 
the genocide in Rwanda.  Thus, the RPF government will participate in peacekeeping 
missions that involve genocide or massive atrocities, but do not expect Rwanda to enter 








Social science theory must be logically consistent, empirically valid, falsifiable 
and parsimonious.  Likewise, the purpose of a theory is to describe, explain and predict 
an important phenomenon.  The theory outlined in this thesis was described using 
statistical analysis, explained using a case study of Rwanda and used to predict near-
future outcomes.  The importance of this theory, that African regimes with slight levels of 
structural legitimacy use peacekeeping to increase their domestic and international 
legitimacy, needs to be reiterated. 
A. IMPORTANCE 
The role of the United Nations and its affiliated regional organizations (like the 
African Union) has expanded since the end of the Cold War.  The growth of 
peacekeeping to include peace enforcement and even peacemaking places an ever-
increasing burden on contributing states.  The amount of peacekeepers African states 
supply on their continent has likewise skyrocketed over the past decade as Western 
powers back off from placing their soldiers in harm’s way in Africa.  Meanwhile, only 
about one-third of African states participate in peacekeeping and the African Union’s 
boldness in conducting peacemaking operations in states still in the midst of war 
increases the risk to individual peacekeepers and thus further jeopardizes the willingness 
of states to contribute.  At the same time, the A.U. is attempting to create the African 
Standby Force (ASF), a pre-prepared multinational peacekeeping force based in each 
region of the continent.  In short, the A.U. and the American military need to understand 
what incentivizes some African nations to participate in peacekeeping in order to keep in 
place, or strengthen, that incentive structure so that high levels of peacekeeping can 
continue and the creation of the ASF can be successful. 
International relations theory further explains the importance of this research 
question.  Realism explains why status quo powers, like South Africa and Nigeria, 
contribute high levels of their military to peacekeeping operations.  However, realism 
predicts that non-status quo powers will freeload off of this public good.  That realism 
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cannot explain the actions of Rwanda, Burundi and numerous other African states 
illustrates the limitations of this perspective.  Even Stephen Walt, a defensive realist 
explains that constructivism may hold the answers to phenomena unexplained by realism; 
“Constructivist theories are best suited to the analysis of how identities and interests can 
change over time, thereby producing subtle shifts in international affairs…realism has 
little to say about these prospects, and policymakers could be blind-sided by change if 
they ignore these possibilities entirely.”150  The importance of the theory presented in this 
thesis is to reveal these other possibilities so that policymakers understand the actions of 
states. 
B. EXPLANATIONS OF AFRICAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
PEACEKEEPING 
This thesis describes why African countries contribute peacekeepers using three 
regression models.  The first two models replicate and update Jonah Victor’s 1990s 
model comparing levels of repression to peacekeeping.  The third model compares levels 
of structural legitimacy to levels of peacekeeping.  The updated models lead to four 
conclusions.  
First, the level of political repression does not statistically correlate to a regime’s 
participation in a certain number of peacekeeping operations, but all moderately 
repressive regimes participate in peacekeeping.  This phenomenon contradicts the 
predictions of realism.  Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett have a better explanation: 
In any society the identity of the self is in important part constituted by the 
expectations of others, and as such state formation is also a process of 
identity formation.  States which feel their identities lacking…try to 
compensate for such ‘incompleteness’ by acquiring the trappings of the 
modern state by a process analogous to conspicuous consumption. The 
things acquired by such ‘symbolic self-completion’ are valued not so 
much for their instrumental virtues as for what they symbolize in this case, 
status and membership in modernity.151 
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Thus, regimes with low structural legitimacy are copying regimes with high structural 
legitimacy in order to appear similar to those legitimate regimes.   
The second conclusion is that political repression is correlated to the level of 
peacekeeping participation in a U-shaped curve.  These sections demonstrated that  
regimes with average levels of repression are participating the least in peacekeeping.  The 
regimes with less repression are contributing at a higher level, as are the regimes with 
more repression.  Regimes with extremely high levels of repression do not participate at 
all, likely due to an inability to do so.  These results illustrate a follow-the-leader 
tendency as described by the Walt and Bennett quote above; repressive regimes find that 
peacekeeping is a manner in which they can increase their legitimacy by copying the 
leadership states of Africa.     
Third, structural legitimacy is correlated to level of peacekeeping participation in 
a U-shaped curve.  Here, we found that regimes with the lowest level of peacekeeping 
participation are again the average regimes.  The regimes with more structural legitimacy 
participate to a higher level, and the regimes with less structural legitimacy also 
participate to a higher level.  Like before, those regimes with no structural legitimacy do 
not participate at all.  Once again, this graph illustrates a follow-the-leader tendency on 
behalf of the slightly legitimate regimes.   
The final conclusion reached from the quantitative data is that these two previous 
correlations are becoming stronger over time.  Not only has the relationship gotten 
stronger overall, but over time the level of political repression has begun to explain a 
higher proportion of a regime’s decision to participate in peacekeeping at a certain level. 
With peacekeeping comes economic and social benefits that lead to political 
strength in the ruling regimes.  Economically, governments that contribute peacekeepers 
can pay their soldiers more, which likely means more money in the hands of the soldiers’ 
families.  Likewise, governments increase their foreign reserves and money available to 




to international norms, which results in more foreign aid and a more secure environment 
for FDI.  The regime benefits politically as their structural legitimacy increases from 
these economic benefits to its citizens.   
In the case of Rwanda, there are also social benefits to peacekeeping.  The RPF 
government uses the history of the party as the protector of Rwandans to create new 
norms to become the protector of all Africans.  Danielle Beswick asserts that “Part of the 
Rwandan regime’s legitimacy stems from action against genocide; involvement in Darfur 
is a way of highlighting this moral authority domestically and internationally and may 
explain why Rwanda has contributed heavily to this mission in particular.”152  
Meanwhile, the RPF uses its peacekeepers to gain both soft power and hard power, by 
both adhering to international norms and threatening to withdraw its peacekeepers.  In 
short, the RPF government is using peacekeeping to increase its structural legitimacy 
internationally so that it can continue to repress opposition parties, but also domestically 
so that eventually the RPF will no longer have to repress the opposition and can win 
elections based on its accomplishments. 
C. PREDICTION FOR FUTURE AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING 
A fundamental premise of constructivism is that identities change, and therefore, 
using constructivism to predict certain events is counterintuitive.  Thus, the following 
predictions will be based mainly on the empirical trends discovered in Chapter III and 
how the current identity formation process in Rwanda will affect its peacekeeping 
contributions in the near future.  
Since the goal of this thesis is to test a theory to explain the level of participation 
of regimes that already participate in peacekeeping, predicting if more or less African 
countries will participate in peacekeeping, and which countries would participate, is 
beyond the scope of this work.  What the author can predict based on his modeling is that 
if a state chooses to participate in peacekeeping, the level of participation of that state  
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will be based on its level of structural legitimacy.  More specifically, if a regime with 
only slight structural legitimacy decides to participate in peacekeeping, that regime will 
likely participate at a high level.   
Rwanda will participate in only very specific missions that will allow the RPF 
government to pay tribute to its own moral legitimacy.  These missions will likely be 
restricted to post-genocide or post-social conflict situations like Darfur.  Likewise, 
Rwanda will likely not participate in post-war situations that do not involve mass 
atrocities of civilians.  However, this trend could change for two reasons.  First, once the 
UN mandate ends in Darfur, the RDF will need to look for a new manner in which to 
fund itself.  That manner could be any UN or A.U. peacekeeping operation in which case 
the Darfur mission was merely a first step to gain internal approval for expansion into all 
peacekeeping operations.  The second reason is that the nation’s identity is ever-changing 
and peacekeeping may no longer be part of that identity, or may become a larger part of 
the Rwandan identity.        
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The final section of this thesis will outline manners in which to test this theory 
and areas in which future research is needed.  This model is falsifiable because new data 
can be tested each year.  The author replicated Victor’s data for the decade after which 
his data ended; likewise, this model should be replicated for the 2010s once that data 
becomes available.  The next ten years will likely have the added benefit of an increasing, 
or at the least stagnant, sample size, which will make any conclusions all the more 
significant.  Furthermore, the data from 2011–2020 will test the trends seen especially 
over the last four years, specifically that the U-shape trend is strengthening. 
Testing these models worldwide would be an important research question, 
especially to discover if worldwide results would be similar to this Sub-Saharan Africa 
phenomenon.  Another test the author recommends once more data is available is 
comparing changes in political repression and structural legitimacy on the continent with 
changes in level of peacekeeping participation.  The author attempted this model but the 
sample size at this point in history is much too small to have any significant conclusions.   
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Figure 8.   Rwanda: Remittance Receipts as a Percentage of Total Trade in Goods and 
Services153 
                                                 
153 The data begins in 1997 because of a 45.6% devaluation of the RWF in 1995 that skewed the data 
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Figure 11.   Rwanda: Foreign Direct Investment156  
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